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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2015, the country saw a sea change in the rights of 
same-sex couples to marry.1  With Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States 
Supreme Court made clear that states could not prohibit same-sex marriage.2 
Obergefell created ripple effects in a number of doctrinal areas, including 
inheritance law.3 
From an inheritance law perspective, Obergefell raises questions about 
the current nature of the marital presumption.4  That doctrine—that a child 
born during an intact marriage is presumed to be the child of the husband—
does significant work in inheritance law.5  The marital presumption provides 
an efficient resolution of the central question for probate courts in estate 
administration—is there a parent-child relationship between the decedent and 
a person claiming a share of the decedent’s estate?6  Every state has a version 
of the marital presumption and, although it is no longer irrebuttable in the 
vast majority of states, it is still a powerful presumption that resolves the 
question in the majority of cases.7 
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 1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See discussion infra Parts III–IV (analyzing case law about the presumption). 
 6. See discussion infra Parts III–IV (analyzing case law about the presumption). 
 7. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204 (West 2015). 
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With the advent of same sex-marriage as a right in every state, there are 
a number of interesting questions about the future of the marital 
presumption.8  Does Obergefell reify marriage and thus the presumption?9 
And is that bad policy?10  For those who argue that the presumption privileges 
marital children, should they redouble their efforts to eliminate the marital 
presumption altogether?11  Should states revise statutes to reflect the fact that 
a woman may now be the nonbirth spouse trying to establish a parent-child 
relationship using a presumption built specifically for men?12  Should those 
in inheritance law separate the definition of the parent-child relationship for 
their purposes from its definition for family law purposes?13 
This article focuses on the last question—the role of the marital 
presumption in inheritance law after Obergefell.14  It describes several 
illustrative cases that have arisen in the family law context, reviews the 
courts’ analysis, and suggests that a conclusive marital presumption be 
extended to all nonbirth/nongenetic spouses for purposes of inheritance 
law.15  Since our system of inheritance law is status-based, establishing the 
parent-child relationship is the key to determining whether someone inherits 
through intestacy or when there is a class gift in a governing instrument like 
a will or trust.16 This article takes the position that Obergefell mandates 
extension of the current presumption to same-sex, nonbirth/nongenetic 
spouses in both family law and inheritance law.17 
The goals of inheritance law in determining parentage include ensuring 
a child has two parents from whom to inherit if possible, an efficient and fair 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 9. See Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 23 (2015) (arguing that Obergefell “reifies marriage as a key element in the social front of family, 
further marginalizing nonmarital families.”). See also Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying 
Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POLICY & L. 671, 703 
(2012) (arguing that tying parental status to civil union or marriage created the risk that lesbian co-parents 
would face greater restrictions on their ability to claim legal parentage status). 
 10. See generally id. 
 11. See generally infra Part II (discussing marriage and children). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. See infra Parts II–V. 
 15. See COURTNEY JOSLIN, SHANNON MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL 
AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 5.22 (2015–2016 ed.) (summarizing the law to date).  The cases 
discussed herein are used merely to illustrate the kinds of analysis courts have applied to the question of 
extending the marital presumption, and this article does not attempt to cover every state case in this regard. 
See id.  Note that I have previously made the argument for a separate definition of parentage for purposes 
of family law and inheritance law. See Paula A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death 
Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857 (2008). 
 16. Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance be Linked?, 49 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 257 (1994). 
 17. See infra Part II. 
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distribution of assets, and the prevention of fraudulent claims.18  These goals 
are not completely aligned with the goal of family law, which is to select the 
adult best suited to raise the child for a number of years.19  While this article 
makes the case for the retention of the presumption, it also makes the case 
for reconceptualizing the presumption from a doctrine that is a surrogate for 
discovering a biological connection between fathers and children, to a 
doctrine based upon the presumed consent of the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse 
to be the parent of any child born during the marriage.20  In so doing, it argues 
that this result can be reconciled with the second and third goals of the 
original intent of the presumption, legitimizing children and protecting the 
intact, marital family from intrusion.21  Those original goals are completely 
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s focus in Obergefell on reducing the stigma 
of children of same-sex couples.22 
State courts, like the Iowa Supreme Court, faced this issue after 
extending the right of marriage to same-sex couples.23  In Gartner v. Iowa 
Department of Public Health, the court considered the question of whether 
the traditional marital presumption should be extended to a female 
nonbirth/nongenetic spouse two years after it extended the right to marry in 
Varnum v. Brien.24  The Iowa Supreme Court decided that it could not 
interpret the statute, using the existing rules of statutory construction, to 
include both men and women.25  However, the Court found that the statute, 
as applied, was unconstitutional, and thus the benefit of the statute must be 
extended to female nonbirth/nongenetic spouses.26 
Like the Iowa Supreme Court in Gartner, it is tempting to assume that 
if the question came up in another state, Obergefell would lead that state court 
to feel compelled to extend the marital presumption to nonbirth/nongenetic 
female spouses.27  But, as seen with the next several cases, some courts have 
refused to extend the presumption.28  This article  first examines those cases, 
and then the cases that have allowed the extension, arguing the latter is the 
correct path.29 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977).  See also 
Paula A. Monopoli, AMERICAN PROBATE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, IMPROVING THE PROCESS (2003) at 
13–14 (describing the goals and purposes of the American probate process more generally). 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 345–48 (Iowa 2013). 
 22. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). 
 23. See Gartner,830 N.W.2d at 335. 
 24. Id.; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 25. See Gartner, 830 N.W.2d at 354. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); Q.M. v. B.C., 995 
N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014); Shineovich v. Shineovich , 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
 29. See infra Parts II–V. 
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II.  OBERGEFELL ON MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN 
Justice Kennedy grounded his majority opinion in Obergefell in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.30  He 
laid out four principles for protecting the right of same sex couples to marry 
including individual autonomy, the right to enjoy intimate association, 
safeguarding children and families, and the fact that marriage is the keystone 
of our social order.31  Of the four bases for extending the right to marry to 
same-sex couples, the third is most salient for the question of whether the 
marital presumption must be extended to female nonbirth/nongenetic 
spouses, now that the United States Supreme Court has extended the right to 
marry.32 
Justice Kennedy drew the third principle from cases like Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska: 
 A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards 
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of 
childrearing, procreation, and education.  The Court has recognized these 
connections by describing the varied rights as a unified whole: “[T]he right 
to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”  Under the laws of the several 
States, some of marriage’s protections for children and families are 
material. But marriage also confers more profound benefits.  By giving 
recognition and legal structure to their parents’ relationship, marriage 
allows children “to understand the integrity and closeness of their own 
family and its concord with other families in their community and in their 
daily lives.”  Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important 
to children’s best interests. 
 
. . . .  
 
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a 
central premise of the right to marry.  Without the recognition, stability, and 
predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing 
their families are somehow lesser.  They also suffer the significant material 
costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of 
their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.  The marriage laws 
at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.33 
Obergefell clearly reifies marriage and marital privilege.34  For those 
who argue that the law should be moving in the opposite direction, one 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
 31. Id. at 2589–90. 
 32. Id. at 2600. 
 33. Id. at 2600–01 (citations omitted). 
 34. See id. 
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alternative to the marital presumption is to move to a purely functional test 
for parentage.35  This would no longer privilege marriage but, as I have 
argued previously, it is inefficient for inheritance law.36  While functional 
parentage makes more sense when the issue is who is the adult best suited to 
raise the child, it is still more resource-consumptive than a parentage rule 
based on status.37  A functional approach makes less sense when the issue is 
simply to whom a decedent’s property will be reallocated at death.38  The 
probate process needs more bright-line rules, given the few resources 
afforded to probate courts in this country and the goals of the process, which 
are to marshal assets, pay creditors, distribute to heirs or beneficiaries, and 
close the estate as quickly as possible.39  This article looks at the barriers to 
making the presumption gender-neutral, as well as the process of 
reconceptualizing its foundations and moving from a model based on a 
surrogate for biology to one of consent.40  It argues for retention of the marital 
presumption for family law based on presumed consent, giving the nonbirth 
spouse a chance to rebut the presumption based on lack of consent.41  This 
article also argues for a conclusive presumption in the case of inheritance 
law, given its different goals.42 
For analytical purposes, this article first considers state cases that have 
refused to extend the presumption to nonbirth/nongenetic spouses, and then 
cases that have extended it.43  Even in the cases that extended the presumption 
on constitutional grounds, there are statutory construction barriers that 
warrant consideration.44  Those barriers may require corrective legislative 
action to extend the presumption to same-sex spouses in order to guarantee 
the gender neutral application of the presumption.45 
III. CASES THAT HAVE NOT EXTENDED THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION TO 
SAME-SEX NONBIRTH/NONGENETIC SPOUSES 
It is instructive to begin by looking at the language in three opinions in 
which state courts have refused to extend the marital presumption to same-
sex nonbirth/nongenetic spouses.46  These include Paczkowski v. Paczkowski 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Monopoli, Nonmarital, supra note 15, at 859–60. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 868–99. 
 41. See id. at 881–88. 
 42. See id. at 897–99. 
 43. See infra Part III. 
 44. See infra Part III. 
 45. See infra Part III. 
 46. Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); Q.M. v. B.C., 995 
N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014); Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
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and Q.M. v. B.C. in New York, and Shineovich v. Shineovich in Oregon.47  
These cases often analyze the rights of the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse as a 
third party vis-à-vis the child as opposed to a parent.48 
Paczkowski involved an appeal from the family court dismissing the 
petition for joint custody of a child.49  The petitioner was the nonbirth/ 
nongenetic spouse in a same sex marriage.50  The court focused on the fact 
that the petitioner could not possibly be the child’s biological parent because 
she had not given birth to the child.51  In doing so, the court leaves the 
petitioner in the status of a nonparent, third-party stranger to the child, despite 
the fact that she was married to the child’s birth mother.52  The appellate 
division found that the lower court properly dismissed the petition for lack of 
standing: 
A nonparent may have standing to seek to displace a parent’s right to 
custody and control of his or her child, but only upon a showing that “the 
parent has relinquished that right due to surrender, abandonment, persistent 
neglect, unfitness, or other extraordinary circumstances.”  Here, the 
petitioner, who is neither an adoptive parent nor a biological parent of the 
subject child, failed to allege the existence of extraordinary circumstances 
that would establish her standing to seek custody.  Contrary to the 
petitioner’s contention, Family Court Act § 417 and Domestic Relations 
Law § 24 do not provide her with standing as a parent, since the presumption 
of legitimacy they create is one of a biological relationship, not of legal 
status, and, as the nongestational spouse in a same-sex marriage, there is no 
possibility that she is the child’s biological parent.53 
Similarly, the family court in Q.M. v. B.C. reasoned that, regardless of 
the marital status of the female couple, the fact that a man, who was not a 
spouse of the birth mother, fathered the child distinguished this case from one 
in which conception was the result of an anonymous sperm donation.54  Q.M. 
v. B.C. involved a paternity action by a man who sought to be declared the 
legal father of a child who was born to a woman, B.C., in a same-sex 
marriage.55  B.C. and her wife, J.S., argued that their marriage itself should 
give the nonbirth, nongenetic spouse legal parentage of the child via the 
marital presumption.56 Thus, the paternity action should be dismissed.57   The 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 270; Q.M., 995 N.Y.S.2d at 470; Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 29. 
 48. Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 270; Q.M., 995 N.Y.S.2d at 470; Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 29. 
 49. Paczkowski, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 270–71. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. at 271 (citations omitted). 
 54. Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473–74 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014). 
 55. Id. at 471. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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court disagreed.58  It noted that, “It has long been presumed that the child 
born of a marriage was fathered by the husband.  The presumption is 
recognized at common law and codified in Domestic Relations Law § 24 and 
Family Court Act § 417.” 59 
The court goes on to note that, traditionally, mothers used the 
presumption to hold fathers to their support obligations, and the focus was on 
two things: (1) establishing that the child was legitimate in the eyes of the 
law, and (2) giving the child both a father and a mother for legal purposes.60  
However, the court noted that the world has changed and, given the advent 
of same-sex marriage, cases have arisen in terms of whether a 
nonbirth/nongenetic spouse is a child’s legal parent by virtue of the 
presumption.61  The court cites Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M (discussed above) 
for the proposition that most of these cases arise in the context of lesbian 
couples who have a child through artificial insemination of the birth mother 
with anonymous sperm.62   In that case, the court did find that the nonbirth/ 
nongenetic spouse was the legal parent via the marital presumption.63  
Distinguishing the facts from Q.M. v. B.C., as the child was not the product 
of artificial insemination using an anonymous sperm donor, the court said: 
 Here, the respondents seek to rely on the presumption of legitimacy to 
establish Ms. S. as J.C.’s second mother, effectively extinguishing J.C.’s 
right to have a father. Ms. C.’s credible and uncontradicted testimony at the 
hearing was that she did not have sexual relations with any man other than 
Mr. M. during the period of J.C.’s conception, and that Mr. M. is J.C.’s 
father.  Thus, there is no dispute that Ms. S. is not, and could not possibly 
be, the second parent of this child.  Moreover, Ms. S. reconciled with Ms. 
C. after Ms. C. discovered she was pregnant, and presumably after she had 
been told that the child was fathered by Mr. M. 
 
 Ms. C. argues that the rights of “non-biological parents” are entitled to 
the same constitutional protections afforded biological parents and suggests 
that the Marriage Equality Act requires that all spouses be treated in a 
completely gender neutral manner.  It is this court’s view that the Marriage 
Equality Act does not require the court to ignore the obvious biological 
differences between husbands and wives.  For instance, as explained above, 
Domestic Relations Law § 73 can be easily applied to same-sex female 
married couples, but not to same-sex male couples, neither of whom are 
able to bear a child.  In the same vein, neither spouse in a same-sex female 
couple can father a child.  Thus, while the language of Domestic Relations 
Law § 10–a requires same-sex married couples to be treated the same as all 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 473. 
 59. Id. (citations omitted). 
 60. Id. at 473. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 473. 
 63. Id. 
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other married couples, it does not preclude differentiation based on essential 
biology.64  
Again, the problem, of course, is that if courts refuse to designate the 
nonbirth/nongentic spouse as a legal parent, it leaves that parent with no 
relationship to the child other than that of a third-party stranger.65  The court 
acknowledges this troubling outcome, but it states: 
 Additionally, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly declined to expand 
the traditional definition of a parent beyond biological or birth parents and 
adoptive parents.  Specifically, the Court has rejected arguments that non-
adoptive or non-biological third parties, such as Ms. S., should be granted 
parental status based on a claim of a close relationship with the child. 
 
 As a result, Ms. S. stands in the position of many loving step-parents, 
male and female, who are not legal parents and are not entitled to court 
ordered custody or visitation with their step-children.  The fact that she was 
married to Ms. C. at the time of J.C.’s birth, under the facts here, does not 
change her status.66 
So, in essence, the court’s analysis is that the marital presumption only 
applies in a case where there is an anonymous sperm donor and two female 
spouses.67  If there is a biological father who is not an anonymous sperm 
donor, that fact trumps the marital presumption in a case where two women 
are validly married when the child is born.68 
Finally, in Shineovich v. Shineovich, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
reviewed a circuit court’s dismissal of a petition denying legal parentage to 
the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse in a same-sex marriage.69  The case involved 
a couple who married before the birth of their second child but whose 
marriage was later declared invalid after a state referendum defined marriage 
as between one man and one woman.70  In later separation proceedings, the 
nonbirth/nongenetic spouse argued that she was the legal parent of the two 
children born during the relationship, and that the marital presumption should 
apply as Oregon’s policy was to extend all the benefits of marriage to 
domestic partners.71  She challenged the constitutionality of the marital 
presumption statute as applied, and the court said: 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 474. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. (citations omitted). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29 (2009). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 35–36. 
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 We turn to petitioner’s arguments on the merits, beginning with her 
contention that ORS 109.070(1) is unconstitutional.  As she did before the 
trial court, petitioner contends that the statute affords to married men a 
privilege—the presumption of being the legal parent of the children of a 
female spouse—that is not available to her because same-sex couples are 
not permitted to marry.  Accordingly, she argues, the statute violates the 
right to equal privileges and immunities guaranteed by Article I, section 20, 
of the Oregon Constitution. 
 
 Respondent argues, among other things, that the presumption created 
by ORS 109.070(1) relates to biological paternity.  Given that there is no 
dispute about whether petitioner is P’s biological parent, she argues that the 
statute cannot be applied to petitioner. 
  
 We agree with respondent. Even if the statute were broadened so as not 
to exclude any individual from its reach on the basis of gender or marital 
status, the presumption still would not apply to petitioner.72 
Like the courts in Paczkowski and Q.M. v. B.C., the Shineovich court 
focuses on the text of the statute and its intent in terms of excluding certain 
husbands who cannot be biologically connected to a child born to that man’s 
wife.73  The court takes great pains to point out that the statute, in its view, 
seeks to determine biological paternity, in part because a man who is not 
physically capable of fathering the child cannot be the legal parent of that 
child under the terms of the statute: 
To construe the statute, we begin by examining the text of ORS 109.070 
(2003) in context.  We may also consider its legislative history and, if 
necessary, other interpretive aids.  Here, the text, read in context, is 
dispositive. ORS 109.070(1) (2013) creates a presumption as to who is the 
biological parent of a child.  By the very terms of the statute, for the 
presumption of parentage to apply, it must be at least possible that the 
person is the biological parent of the child.  The purpose of ORS 109.070(1) 
(2003) is to establish paternity.  “Paternity” means “origin or descent from 
a father” or “male parentage.”  Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1654 
(unabridged ed 2002).  Even if the gender aspect of the word is disregarded, 
“paternity” refers to the genetic relationship between parent and child.  See 
ORS 109.251 (defining “blood tests” to include “any test for genetic 
markers to determine paternity”); Webster’s at 1654 (defining “paternity 
test” as “a test to determine whether a given man could be father to a 
particular child made by comparison of the blood groups of the mother, 
child, and suspected man, a negative result proving that the man cannot be 
the father while a positive result shows only that it is biologically possible 
that he may be”).  Indeed, the conclusive presumption of paternity does not 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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apply to a married man who is not biologically capable of having conceived 
a child borne by his wife: ORS 109.070(1)(a) (2003) provides, “The child 
of a wife cohabiting with her husband who was not impotent or sterile at 
the time of the conception of the child shall be conclusively presumed to be 
the child of her husband.” (emphasis added).74 
The court concludes that because the nonbirth/nongenetic partner 
cannot possibly be the biological parent of the child at issue, there is no 
constitutional infirmity because the presumption does not apply to those 
persons who are not even conceivably biologically related to the child.75  
Even if marital status or gender were removed, the statute would still not 
apply to her.76  The court finds that she is not “entitled to a declaration of 
legal parentage under the statute.” 77 
IV.  CASES THAT HAVE EXTENDED THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION TO SAME-
SEX NONBIRTH/NONGENETIC SPOUSES 
Other state courts have come to a different conclusion; there are cases 
where state courts have agreed to extend the marital presumption to same-
sex nonbirth/nongenetic spouses despite the marital presumption’s historical 
foundation in biology.78 
Barse v. Pasternak involved a dissolution of marriage action in which 
the spouses sought custody of the child of the marriage.79  The trial court 
awarded sole custody to the nongenetic/nonbirth spouse.80  After a number 
of procedural appeals, the Superior Court took up the issue of whether the 
nonbirth/nongenetic spouse was properly found to be the child’s legal parent 
under the marital presumption where there had been no adoption of the 
child.81  That court said that the common-law presumption of legitimacy, also 
known as the marital presumption, was “well founded in Connecticut’s 
common law.”82  The court noted the reciprocal nature of the determination 
of parentage: 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 36 (citations omitted). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (Note that while the Shineovich court refused to confer legal parentage on the female nonbirth 
spouse under the marital presumption statute, ORS 109.070(1) (2003), it went on to confer legal parentage 
on the spouse under a separate statute, ORS 109.243, that confers legal parentage on the husband of a 
woman who had undergone artificial insemination by extending that statute to include female nonbirth 
spouses. 
 78. See, e.g., Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *1 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 16, 2015); Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); Gartner v. Iowa 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013); Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2012). 
 79. Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *1. 
 80. Id. at *1. 
 81. Id. at *1–2. 
 82. Id. at *8. 
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The phrases “presumption of legitimacy” and “marital presumption” are 
used interchangeably.  “[T]he concept of ‘child of the marriage’ defines 
who is a parent for purposes of awarding custody in a dissolution action. 
The child of the marriage and the parent of the child are two sides of the 
same coin.”  In other words, if a minor child is “issue” or “child” of the 
parties’ marriage, he or she is presumed to be legitimate (i.e., the 
presumption of legitimacy), and the parties to the marriage are presumed to 
be the legal parents of that child (i.e., the marital presumption).83 
The Barse court sets the stage for its analysis by noting that this was a 
case of first impression in Connecticut, having found no precedent for 
whether the marital presumption should extend to same-sex marriages.84  The 
court looked to  Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health for some insight 
into how to approach the novel question.85  Like Justice Kennedy in 
Obergefell, the court focuses in particular on the benefits that flow to children 
from allowing same-sex marriages: 
In Kerrigan, the Supreme Court found that same-sex couples cannot 
be denied the constitutional right to marry. In reaching this conclusion, the 
court examined the economic and sociological implications of granting 
same-sex couples, the right to marry. . . . The Supreme Court also noted the 
positive effects that affording same-sex couples the right to marry would 
have on children: “Because of the significance of marriage in our society, 
the freedom to marry is an extraordinarily important right for all persons 
who wish to exercise it.  As the Alliance for Marriage acknowledged in its 
amicus brief in support of the defendants, children reared by married 
couples and married couples themselves benefit greatly from marriage—
apart from any legal benefits conferred on the family.  Benefits to the 
married couple include greater longevity, greater wealth, more fulfilling 
sexual relationships, and greater happiness.”  Further, “the ban on same sex 
marriage is likely to have an especially deleterious effect on the children of 
same sex couples.  A primary reason why many same sex couples wish to 
marry is so that their children can feel secure in knowing that their parents’ 
relationships are as valid and as valued as the marital relationships of their 
friends’ parents.  Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage will not 
make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does prevent 
children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages 
that flow from the assurance of a stable family structure in which the 
children will be reared, educated, and socialized.”86 
The court went on to state that, given the clear mandate of Kerrigan, it 
was bound to find that the common law presumption of legitimacy and the 
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marital presumption applied to the children of same-sex married couples.87  
After finding that the presumption applied, the court went on to address 
corollary issues with regard to whether the birth spouse could be estopped 
from rebutting the presumption, as a wife might be in an opposite-sex 
marriage context if she sat on her rights and treated the husband as if he were 
the father, and he suffered detriment as a result: 
In Weidenbacher, the court held that the presumption of legitimacy is 
rebuttable by a person “who presents clear, convincing and satisfactory 
evidence that the mother’s husband is not the child’s natural father.” 
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the defendant can easily meet her 
burden because the parties have stipulated that the plaintiff has no genetic 
relationship to the minor child.  Consequently, the court must consider 
whether there are any circumstances under which the defendant may be 
precluded from rebutting the presumption that the plaintiff is the minor 
child’s legal parent.  The plaintiff argues that such circumstances reside in 
the law of equity, and in particular under the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel.88 
In an opposite-sex marriage, the presumption would typically be 
rebutted by DNA evidence today.89  The court would order genetic testing 
and, if the husband had no genetic link to the child, the court may determine 
that he is not the legal parent.90  Courts do retain the equitable power to 
declare that, even despite a genetic connection and the rebuttal of the 
presumption, the child’s best interests require the husband to retain legal 
parentage.91  The Barse court found that equitable estoppel is available as a 
defense on the part of the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse in this case, but that 
whether it applies in this case is a factual matter to be determined by a 
separate, evidentiary hearing.92  However, the court does not address how to 
rebut such a presumption by an admittedly nonbirth/nongenetic female 
spouse. But the gravamen of such a rebuttal presumably lies in a lack of 
consent to the artificial insemination procedure.93 
The Barse court also addressed the consent requirements and whether a 
failure to strictly adhere to those requirements automatically results in a 
husband losing his presumptive parental status.94  Citing to a New York case, 
W. v. W., the court noted that there may be issues of equity which defeat this 
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result.95  The court then cited Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, discussed next, to 
conclude that the birth mother may not use the nonbirth mothers’ 
noncompliance to strip her of parentage.96  Once again, the Barse court 
focused on the legislative goal of giving children legitimate status whenever 
possible in reaching its decision.97 
In Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, the New York court reviewed a case in 
which the child was conceived using an anonymous sperm donor, in contrast 
to the New York case of Q.M. discussed above.98  In Wendy G-M, the court 
does address how the marital presumption applied to same-sex couples 
intersects with the consent issue, stating that: 
In response to the presumption created by marriage, the birth mother argues 
before this court that if a biological stranger were presumed to be a parent, 
the potential exists for a birth mother to have artificial insemination, without 
the permission of the married spouse, and then the unknowing, non-
biological, marital partner could be “obligated for 21 years of support.”  The 
argument does not defeat the holding here. A consent, properly executed 
and acknowledged under DRL § 73, is irrefutable.  The presumption that 
arises in this case-the presumption of a spouse’s consent to artificial 
insemination-is not irrefutable.  The marital consent presumed in this case 
may be rebutted by either spouse in the same-sex marriage.  The birth-
mother could produce evidence that she never intended her spouse to be the 
parent of the AID child.  The unknowing spouse would be faced with a 
presumption of consent to parenthood by virtue of the marriage and would 
have ample opportunity to rebut the presumption with evidence that the 
birth mother failed to obtain any consent prior to the conception.  The 
unknowing, non-biological spouse, would be required to overcome the 
presumption of consent, and prove lack of consent.99 
In holding that the marital presumption must apply to same-sex 
nonbirth/nongenetic spouses, the G.M. court once again relied on the New 
York law legalizing same-sex marriage and its necessary implications that all 
the same benefits that flow from marriage extend to same-sex couples, not 
simply the right to marry.100 
The Marriage Equality Act swept away many of the sex-based distinctions 
in New York’s Domestic Relations Law in the spirit of individuals making 
their own choices in both entering and living a married life, free from 
unreasonable restraints.  Section 2 of the MEA mandates that not only 
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statutes, but the common law as well, are gender neutral with respect to all 
the legal benefits, obligations, etc. arising from marriage.  DRL § 10–a(2). 
In Laura WW. v. Peter WW., the Third Department predicated the husband’s 
parental status on the fact of marriage, without regard to the husband’s 
biological connection to the child or to his fertility in general.  To impose 
the presumption of consent to AID for couples in a heterosexual marriage, 
but not for those in a same-sex one, when both are similarly situated, but for 
sexual orientation, would reverse the gender-neutral approach to New 
York’s families canonized in the MEA.  In Laura WW. v. Peter WW., the 
Third Department properly started New York down the path of presuming 
that the child of either partner in a married same sex couple will be 
presumed to be the child of both, even though the child is not genetically 
linked to both parents. . . . . This court will not stop that march to greater 
equality for all lawfully married couples.  The pervasive and powerful 
common law presumptions that link both spouses in a marriage to a child 
born of the marriage-the presumption of legitimacy within a marriage and 
the presumption of a spouse’s consent to artificial insemination-apply to this 
couple.  This court holds that the non-biological spouse is a parent of this 
child under the common law of New York as much as the birth-mother.101 
Finally, the Iowa Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gartner v. Iowa 
Department of Public Health is particularly salient regarding how to extend 
the marital presumption after that state’s highest court approved same-sex 
marriage.102  In Gartner, a same-sex couple wanted to list the nonbirth/ 
nongenetic spouse’s name on their child’s birth certificate.103  The couple was 
validly married when their child was born, as the Iowa Supreme Court 
previously struck down its Defense of Marriage Act in Varnum v. 
Brien.104  The Iowa Department of Health refused to put the nonbirth/ 
nongenetic spouse’s name on the child’s birth certificate because that spouse 
had not adopted the child.105  The Department’s position was that, “[t]he 
system for registration of births in Iowa currently recognizes the biological 
and ‘gendered’ roles of ‘mother’ and ‘father,’ grounded in the biological fact 
that a child has one biological mother and one biological father.”106   The 
couple subsequently brought an action to have the nonbirth/nongenetic 
spouse named as a parent on the birth certificate.107  The district court ordered 
the department to do so, and the case went up on appeal to the Iowa Supreme 
Court.108 
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After reciting the facts of the case, the court in Gartner laid out the 
marital presumption in Iowa: 
 For purposes of preparing a birth certificate, the Code includes a 
presumption of parentage.  The legislature articulated the following 
procedure for preparing a child’s birth certificate, based upon the 
presumption of parentage: 
 
If the mother was married at the time of conception, birth, or at any 
time during the period between conception and birth, the name of 
the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the 
child unless paternity has been determined otherwise by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, in which case the name of the father as 
determined by the court shall be entered by the department. 
 
 The statute is rebuttable under the preponderance standard “by clear, 
strong and satisfactory evidence.”  The challenging party must also 
demonstrate a parental relationship with the child.  Here, rebutting the 
presumption is a nonissue, because Heather conceived Mackenzie using an 
anonymous sperm donor.109 
The Gartner court effectively lays out the origins and goals of the 
martial presumption.110  This description is helpful in thinking about how to 
link the presumption’s original intent and goals with the brave new world of 
same-sex marriage and nonbirth/nongenetic spouses after Obergefell.111 
 The presumption of parentage is a fundamental legal construct 
originating in common law. 
 
. . . . 
 
Legislatures across the nation have adopted statutes codifying a 
presumption of parentage in order to address several key social policies. 
Specifically, “the presumption protected the legitimacy of children, which 
in turn entitled them to the financial support, inheritance rights, and filiation 
obligations of their parents.”  It thwarted the possibility that children would 
become wards of the state and promoted familial stability by preventing “a 
third-party putative father from insinuating himself onto an intact family by 
claiming to have sired one of the family’s children.”  Moreover, at a time 
when “genetic origins were more a matter of suspicion than science,” the 
presumption served judicial efficiency by curtailing debates between 
parents as to the biological nature of their parent–child relationship. 
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Based on these social policies,. . . . [s]pecific to Iowa, our court long 
ago articulated the principal bases for presuming a child born in wedlock is 
the legitimate issue of the marital spouses: 
“This rule is founded on decency, morality, and public policy.  By 
that rule, the child is protected in his inheritance and safeguarded 
against future humiliation and shame.  Likewise, under the rule, 
the family relationship is kept sacred and the peace and harmony 
thereof preserved.  No one, by incompetent evidence, can malign 
the virtue of the mother, and no one, by such evidence, can 
interrupt the harmony of the family relationship and undermine the 
sanctity of the home.” 
 
Taking these policies individually, we recognize the strong stigma 
accompanying illegitimacy.  The presumption counteracts the stigma by 
protecting the integrity of the marital family, even when a biological 
connection is not present.112 
 
While acknowledging all the benefits of the marital presumption, the 
Gartner court found that the district court was wrong to extend those benefits 
to same-sex marital couples simply by means of statutory interpretation.113 
Iowa law on this point did not allow for a general neutral interpretation of the 
marital presumption: 
The district court interpreted section 144.13(2) to require the Department to 
list Melissa as Mackenzie’s second parent on the birth certificate.  We do 
not agree the statute can be interpreted in this way. 
 
. . . . 
 
A specific rule of construction found in Iowa Code section 4.1 applies 
to statutes containing gendered terms and assists us in ascertaining the 
legislature’s intent.  Section 4.1 provides: “Words of one gender include the 
other genders.”  This is not, however, a blanket rule applicable to all types 
of statutes.  Instead, courts construing statutes can only utilize this rule when 
the statute uses a specific type of gendered language. 
 
When the statute refers to only one gender and the gender referenced is 
masculine, section 4.1(17) extends the statute to include females. . . . 
 
However, when the statute refers to only one gender and the gender 
referenced is feminine, section 4.1(17) does not extend the scope of the 
statute to include males.  There, the court found that a husband could not 
recover under a pension statute, because the court could not enlarge the term 
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“widow,” as it referred to the surviving spouse who was eligible for survivor 
benefits, to include “widowers.” 
 
Finally, when the statute employs both masculine and feminine words, 
section 4.1(17) does not apply.  Reading such a statute in a gender-neutral 
manner “would destroy or change” the plain and unambiguous language, 
and would “nullif[y] the intent of the Legislature.” 
 
Iowa’s presumption of parentage statute expressly uses both masculine 
and feminine words by referring to a mother, father, and husband.  
Accordingly, section 4.1(17) does not apply.  If we applied the rule and 
imposed a gender-neutral interpretation of the presumption, we would 
destroy the legislature’s intent to unambiguously differentiate between the 
roles assigned to the two sexes.  Only a male can be a husband or father.  
Only a female can be a wife or mother.  The legislature used plain and 
unambiguous language to convey its intent.  Thus, we cannot nullify the 
intent of the legislature by finding otherwise through statutory construction. 
Finally, the district court relied on our decision in Varnum to compel 
its statutory construction analysis.  At the time of enactment, the legislature 
made a conscious choice to use the word “husband.”  It could have chosen 
to use spouse or other such language, but it did not.  Varnum was decided 
thirty-nine years after the legislature enacted section 144.13(2).  Hence, it 
is doubtful the legislature considered same-sex marriages when it enacted 
section 144.13(2).  Husband was an unambiguous term at the time of 
passing section 144.13(2).  Therefore, we cannot use the rules of statutory 
construction to extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the plain meaning of 
section 144.13(2).114 
Unable to use statutory construction to gender-neutralize the marital 
presumption, the Gartner court turned to constitutional means of doing so.115 
The court looked to the state constitution’s equal protection guarantee.116 
Harkening back to its decision in Varnum, the court stated: 
Thus, with respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, we 
find the Gartners similarly situated to married opposite-sex couples.  The 
Gartners are in a legally recognized marriage, just like opposite-sex couples. 
The official recognition of their child as part of their family provides a basis 
for identifying and verifying the birth of their child, just as it does for 
opposite-sex couples.  Additionally, married lesbian couples require 
accurate records of their child’s birth, as do their opposite-sex counterparts. 
The distinction for this purpose between married opposite-sex couples and 
married lesbian couples does not exist and cannot defeat an equal protection 
analysis.  Therefore, with respect to the government’s purpose of 
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identifying a child as part of their family and providing a basis for verifying 
the birth of a child, married lesbian couples are similarly situated to spouses 
and parents in an opposite-sex marriage.117 
The Public Health Department argued that there were three important 
governmental objectives in putting the male spouse’s name on a birth 
certificate but refusing to do so for a nonbirth/nongenetic female spouse: 
(1) the accuracy of birth certificates; (2) the efficiency and effectiveness of 
government administration; and (3) the determination of paternity.118  The 
court considered and dismissed each governmental interest in turn: 
  First, we understand that ensuring the accuracy of birth records for 
identification of biological parents is a laudable goal.  However, the present 
system does not always accurately identify the biological father.  When a 
married opposite-sex couple conceives a child using an anonymous sperm 
donor, the child’s birth certificate reflects the male spouse as the father, not 
the biological father who donated the sperm.  In that situation, the 
Department is not aware the couple conceived the child by an anonymous 
sperm donor. 
 
  Furthermore, the Department claims that the only way a married 
lesbian couple, who uses an anonymous sperm donor to conceive the child, 
can list the nonbirthing spouse as the parent on the birth certificate is to go 
through an adoption proceeding.  This will not make the birth certificate any 
more accurate than applying the presumption of parentage for married 
lesbian couples, because the birth certificate still will not identify the 
biological father.  The birth records of this state do not contain a statistical 
database listing the children conceived using anonymous sperm donors.  
Thus, the classification is not substantially related to the asserted 
governmental purpose of accuracy. 
 
  The Department next asserts the refusal to apply the presumption of 
parentage to nonbirthing spouses in lesbian marriages serves administrative 
efficiency and effectiveness.  The Department argues that it takes valuable 
resources to reissue a birth certificate when a challenger successfully rebuts 
the presumption of parentage.  However, when couples use an anonymous 
sperm donor, there will be no rebuttal of paternity.  Moreover, even when 
couples conceive without using an anonymous sperm donor, there is no 
showing in the record that the presumption of paternity in opposite-sex 
marriages is rebutted in a significant number of births. 
 
. . . . 
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  The third proffered reason for the Department’s action is the 
government’s interest in establishing paternity to ensure financial support 
of the child and the fundamental legal rights of the father.  When a lesbian 
couple is married, it is just as important to establish who is financially 
responsible for the child and the legal rights of the nonbirthing spouse.119 
 
In the end, the Gartner court found that the marital presumption statute 
violated the Iowa Constitution’s Equal Protection clause as applied to lesbian 
couples, reiterating the import of the same-sex marriage case, not just that the 
right to marry was upheld, but that all the benefits of marriage for the couple 
and their children were to be extended as well: 
It is important for our laws to recognize that married lesbian couples who 
have children enjoy the same benefits and burdens as married opposite-sex 
couples who have children.  By naming the nonbirthing spouse on the birth 
certificate of a married lesbian couple’s child, the child is ensured support 
from that parent and the parent establishes fundamental legal rights at the 
moment of birth.  Therefore, the only explanation for not listing the 
nonbirthing lesbian spouse on the birth certificate is stereotype or prejudice. 
The exclusion of the nonbirthing spouse on the birth certificate of a child 
born to a married lesbian couple is not substantially related to the objective 
of establishing parentage.120 
However, instead of striking down the statute, the court “preserve[d] it 
as to married opposite-sex couples and require[d] the Department to apply 
the statute to married lesbian couples.”121  The court affirmed the district 
court and ordered the Department to issue a birth certificate naming Melissa 
Gartner as the parent of Mackenzie Gartner.122  While that decision may make 
people feel assured that the marital presumption will automatically apply to 
same-sex spouses, several courts, as discussed above, have refused to extend 
it to same-sex couples, even in states that allow same-sex marriage.123  Their 
reasoning is grounded in the lack of fit between the original presumption 
grounded in biology, and the structure of same-sex marriage, where two 
parents cannot both be the biological parents of the children of the 
marriage.124  So, any judicial or legislative resolution to extend the marital 
presumption must involve a reconceptualization of the basis of the 
presumption and moving it away from biology to presumed consent.125 
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V.  SHIFTING THE FOUNDATION OF THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION FROM 
BIOLOGY TO CONSENT 
The theme sounded by the courts that refused to extend the marital 
presumption to same-sex couples was that the marital presumption had its 
origins in establishing that the husband of a couple was the biological father 
of a child born to the wife during the marriage.126  Those courts cite the use 
of the words “father” and “paternity” and the inclusion of exemptions for 
husbands who were not physically or otherwise capable of fathering the child 
as proof of this purpose.127  They focus less on the presumption’s goals of 
having certainty for the child in terms of legitimacy, having two parents for 
legal purposes, and the protection of the intact, marital family from external 
intrusion.128  If those goals become the focus, then the following move from 
biology to consent becomes consistent with the original purposes of the 
marital presumption.129   
The courts that extended the marital presumption to same-sex couples 
have focused on the implications of case law validating same-sex marriage 
and the import of the court’s reasoning in those cases.130  The state cases that 
validated same-sex marriage prior to Obergefell focused on the dignity of the 
marriage and the benefits to the children of the marriage.131  Instead of 
focusing on only one of the original goals of the presumption, establishing a 
surrogate for biology, these courts focus  on the goal of legitimizing children 
and extending benefits meant to flow from their state courts’ decision 
allowing same-sex couples to marry.132   This shift in focus allows the second 
group of courts to reach conclusions about the presumption grounded in the 
law’s shift to recognize such marriages and the children who are within their 
protective ambit.133 
So there is a way to reconcile the original goals of the presumption with 
Obergefell.134  If the focus is primarily on the role of the marital presumption 
as a means to legitimize children, give a child two parents, and protect the 
marital family—rather than as a surrogate for a biological connection to the 
husband of a wife who gives birth—then there is a consistent reading of the 
original intent of the marital presumption with Obergefell’s focus on 
legitimizing children of same-sex couples and ensuring that all the benefits 
of marriage extend to those children.135 
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Rather than the legal fiction that the husband of every wife who bears a 
child within marriage is the biological child of that man, the new presumption 
would be grounded in the concept that presumes every spouse consents to a 
child who is born during the marriage and intends that child to be his or hers, 
unless evidence is presented to rebut the presumption of consent.136  A 
spouse’s evidence of deception would be sufficient to rebut the 
presumption.137  But evidence of a biological connection with someone 
outside the marriage would not be sufficient—absent evidence of 
deception.138 
A.  Inheritance Law 
With the exception of Gartner, most of the cases discussed involved 
divorce in the context of family law.139  In those cases, a same-sex female 
couple was divorcing, and the nonbirth/nongenetic spouse was seeking 
custody and/or visitation.140  These cases do not consider the marital 
presumption in the context of inheritance law and distributing a decedent’s 
estate after she has died.141  However, they do provide a place to begin the 
analysis for inheritance law, although the goals of that area of law differ 
markedly from family law in terms of the parent-focused nature of the cases 
brought in family law.142  Gartner, in particular, provides a sound analytical 
basis for extending the presumption in family law and inheritance law.143  In 
inheritance law, rather than an adult seeking a declaration as the legal parent 
of a child, it is the child who is seeking to establish the parent-child 
relationship.144  The child seeks this determination of parentage, not for 
caregiving purposes, but for eligibility to receive a share of the decedent’s 
estate.145  If the language of Obergefell is taken seriously seriously—that the 
dignity and protection of children of the family is of utmost importance in its 
decision to extend marriage to same-sex couples—the focus should be on 
protecting that child’s right to have two parents for all purposes, including 
inheritance.146 
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As noted above, American inheritance law is a status-based system.147  
People inherit based on their relationship to the decedent.148  So establishing 
a parent-child relationship is central to determining if a child will inherit from 
a decedent.149  In the absence of an adjudication of the issue during life—
which would be dispositive—parentage issues may arise after someone has 
died during the course of estate administration.150  The decedent may have 
died intestate and the statute provides for the estate to go to “issue”, or 
someone may have left a class gift in her will to her children or her son’s 
children.151  In either case, there needs to be a quick, easy way to determine 
parentage when it has not been adjudicated during life.152  The marital 
presumption provides one way to efficiently make this determination at 
death.153  Extending the marital presumption to same-sex nonbirth/ 
nongenetic spouses for purposes of inheritance law supports the goals of a 
child having two legal parents from whom he or she can inherit and the 
orderly administration of estates.154 
An action in federal court striking down one of the state codifications of 
the marital presumption that is not gender neutral could extend the marital 
presumption to same-sex couples.155  For example, the Texas statute says, “A 
man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . he is married to the mother 
of the child and the child is born during the marriage.”156  The marital 
presumption could also be extended state by state via legislative action.157  In 
keeping with that idea, the Uniform Probate Code could amend Article II to 
add its own gender-neutral presumption akin to that found in the Arkansas 
statutes: “A child born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the 
legitimate child of both spouses.”158 
The Uniform Probate Code does not currently have its own 
presumption; rather it incorporates the Uniform Parentage Act presumption 
by reference.159  In addition to creating a gender-neutral presumption in the 
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Uniform Probate Code itself, I would make the presumption conclusive.160  
In family law, having a rebuttable presumption makes sense given the 
profound implications of giving an adult the significant duties of parentage 
during a child’s life.161  If a nonbirth spouse did not consent to being a parent, 
the presumption should not apply.162  However, in inheritance law, making 
the presumption conclusive or irrebuttable, as it was historically, makes more 
sense.163  In inheritance law, the goal is to determine the eligible takers based 
on their relationship to the decedent and move the assets to them as efficiently 
as possible.164  Having a conclusive presumption accomplishes this goal.165 
Such a rule would bring fairness to same-sex couples and stability, a 
touchstone of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell, to their children.166  
It would also bring state statutes in line with the spirit of Obergefell to 
provide all the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples and their children.167  
Finally, it would ensure that every child has two parents for purposes of 
inheritance, and it would further the efficient, orderly administration of 
estates, which are both major goals of American inheritance law.168 
                                                                                                                 
Uniform Parentage Act’s presumption in favor of nonmarital children as well so that marital status would 
not be the exclusive means by which parentage could be determined. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
§§ 204(a)(4) and (5). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See Monopoli, Nonmarital, supra note 15, at 880–84. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 880. 
 164. See supra Part IV. 
 165. See supra Parts II–III. 
 166. See supra Part II. 
 167. See supra Parts II–IV. 
 168. See supra Part IV. 
